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U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Administrative Appeals Office (AAO)
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., MS 2090
Washington, DC 20529-2090



U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services

DATE: AUG 23 2013

OFFICE: TEXAS SERVICE CENTER

IN RE:

Petitioner:

Beneficiary:

PETITION: Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker as a Member of the Professions Holding an Advanced Degree or an Alien of Exceptional Ability Pursuant to Section 203(b)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(2)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:

INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) in your case.

This is a non-precedent decision. The AAO does not announce new constructions of law nor establish agency policy through non-precedent decisions. If you believe the AAO incorrectly applied current law or policy to your case or if you seek to present new facts for consideration, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen, respectively. Any motion must be filed on a Notice of Appeal or Motion (Form I-290B) within 33 days of the date of this decision. **Please review the Form I-290B instructions at <http://www.uscis.gov/forms> for the latest information on fee, filing location, and other requirements. See also 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. Do not file a motion directly with the AAO.**

Thank you,

Elizabeth McCormack

Ron Rosenberg
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The Director, Texas Service Center, denied the immigrant visa petition and the matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The petitioner describes itself as a software development service. It seeks to permanently employ the beneficiary in the United States as a programmer analyst. The petitioner requests classification of the beneficiary as an advanced degree professional pursuant to section 203(b)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(2).

The primary issue in this case is whether the beneficiary possesses an advanced degree as required by the terms of the labor certification and the requested preference classification.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

As required by statute, the petition is accompanied by an ETA Form 9089, Application for Permanent Employment Certification (labor certification), approved by the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL).¹ The priority date of the petition is July 14, 2009.²

Part H of the labor certification states that the offered position has the following minimum requirements:

- H.4. Education: Bachelor's degree in Computer Science.
- H.5. Training: None required.
- H.6. Experience in the job offered: 60 months.
- H.7. Alternate field of study: None accepted.
- H.8. Alternate combination of education and experience: Yes, Master's Degree and one year of experience.
- H.9. Foreign educational equivalent: Accepted.
- H.10. Experience in an alternate occupation: Yes, 60 months of experience as programmer analyst, product architect/engineer, software engineer/archi.
- H.14. Specific skills or other requirements: Bachelor's degree in computer science or foreign equivalent and 5 years' experience.. Masters in Computer Science..or any other suitable combination.

Part J of the labor certification states that the beneficiary possesses a Bachelor's degree in Computer Information Science (CIS) from [REDACTED] completed in 2003. The record contains a copy of the beneficiary's diploma and transcripts from [REDACTED]

¹ See section 212(a)(5)(D) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(5)(D); *see also* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(a)(2).

² The priority date is the date the DOL accepted the labor certification for processing. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(d).

Pakistan, completed in 1997.³ On April 22, 2010, the beneficiary declared under penalty of perjury that all of the information concerning his claimed education and work experience was true and correct on the ETA Form 9089.

The record also contains an evaluation of the beneficiary's educational credentials prepared by [REDACTED] on July 14, 2009. The evaluation states that the beneficiary's two years of CIS education and his professional work experience is equivalent to a U.S. bachelor's in science degree in CIS from an accredited college or university. Additionally, the record contains an evaluation of the beneficiary's educational credentials prepared by the American Association of Collegiate Registrars and Admissions Officers (AACARO) on January 24, 2013. The evaluation states that the beneficiary's two years of CIS education and a Master of Arts Degree in Marketing is comparable to a U.S. Masters of Arts from an accredited college or university.⁴ The director in his denial of the instant petition found that the beneficiary did not possess a foreign equivalent degree to a U.S. bachelor's or a U.S. master's degree in computer science.

On appeal, the petitioner through counsel asserts that either the [REDACTED] educational evaluation establishes the beneficiary's education or alternately that the combination of the beneficiary's CIS education and his Master's degree in marketing qualifies him for the job offered.

The petitioner's appeal is properly filed and makes a specific allegation of error in law or fact. The AAO conducts appellate review on a *de novo* basis.⁵ The AAO considers all pertinent evidence in the record, including new evidence properly submitted upon appeal.⁶ A petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by the AAO even if the director does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision.⁷

II. LAW AND ANALYSIS

³ There is no explanation of record resolving this inconsistency in dates.

⁴ We also note that the record contains another education evaluation from Foreign Credential Evaluations, Inc. dated May 16, 2006, which indicates that the beneficiary has only two years of education equivalent to two years of U.S. university study. The beneficiary's education and work experience was combined to create a U.S. bachelor's degree equivalency.

⁵ See 5 U.S.C. 557(b) ("On appeal from or review of the initial decision, the agency has all the powers which it would have in making the initial decision except as it may limit the issues on notice or by rule."); see also *Janka v. U.S. Dept. of Transp., NTSB*, 925 F.2d 1147, 1149 (9th Cir. 1991). The AAO's *de novo* authority has been long recognized by the federal courts. See, e.g., *Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004).

⁶ The submission of additional evidence on appeal is allowed by the instructions to Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, which are incorporated into the regulations by 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(1). The record in the instant case provides no reason to preclude consideration of any of the documents newly submitted on appeal. See *Matter of Soriano*, 19 I&N Dec. 764 (BIA 1988).

⁷ See *Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States*, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), *aff'd*, 345 F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2003).

The Roles of the DOL and USCIS in the Immigrant Visa Process

At the outset, it is important to discuss the respective roles of the DOL and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) in the employment-based immigrant visa process. As noted above, the labor certification in this matter is certified by the DOL. The DOL's role in this process is set forth at section 212(a)(5)(A)(i) of the Act, which provides:

Any alien who seeks to enter the United States for the purpose of performing skilled or unskilled labor is inadmissible, unless the Secretary of Labor has determined and certified to the Secretary of State and the Attorney General that-

(I) there are not sufficient workers who are able, willing, qualified (or equally qualified in the case of an alien described in clause (ii)) and available at the time of application for a visa and admission to the United States and at the place where the alien is to perform such skilled or unskilled labor, and

(II) the employment of such alien will not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of workers in the United States similarly employed.

It is significant that none of the above inquiries assigned to the DOL, or the regulations implementing these duties under 20 C.F.R. § 656, involve a determination as to whether the position and the alien are qualified for a specific immigrant classification. This fact has not gone unnoticed by federal circuit courts:

There is no doubt that the authority to make preference classification decisions rests with INS. The language of section 204 cannot be read otherwise. *See Castaneda-Gonzalez v. INS*, 564 F.2d 417, 429 (D.C. Cir. 1977). In turn, DOL has the authority to make the two determinations listed in section 212(a)(14).⁸ *Id.* at 423. The necessary result of these two grants of authority is that section 212(a)(14) determinations are not subject to review by INS absent fraud or willful misrepresentation, but all matters relating to preference classification eligibility not expressly delegated to DOL remain within INS' authority.

Given the language of the Act, the totality of the legislative history, and the agencies' own interpretations of their duties under the Act, we must conclude that Congress did not intend DOL to have primary authority to make any determinations other than the two stated in section 212(a)(14). If DOL is to analyze alien qualifications, it is for the purpose of "matching" them with those of corresponding United States workers so

⁸ Based on revisions to the Act, the current citation is section 212(a)(5)(A).

that it will then be "in a position to meet the requirement of the law," namely the section 212(a)(14) determinations.

Madany v. Smith, 696 F.2d 1008, 1012-1013 (D.C. Cir. 1983). Relying in part on *Madany*, 696 F.2d at 1008, the Ninth Circuit stated:

[I]t appears that the DOL is responsible only for determining the availability of suitable American workers for a job and the impact of alien employment upon the domestic labor market. It does not appear that the DOL's role extends to determining if the alien is qualified for the job for which he seeks sixth preference status. That determination appears to be delegated to the INS under section 204(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1154(b), as one of the determinations incident to the INS's decision whether the alien is entitled to sixth preference status.

K.R.K. Irvine, Inc. v. Landon, 699 F.2d 1006, 1008 (9th Cir. 1983). The court relied on an amicus brief from the DOL that stated the following:

The labor certification made by the Secretary of Labor . . . pursuant to section 212(a)(14) of the [Act] is binding as to the findings of whether there are able, willing, qualified, and available United States workers for the job offered to the alien, and whether employment of the alien under the terms set by the employer would adversely affect the wages and working conditions of similarly employed United States workers. *The labor certification in no way indicates that the alien offered the certified job opportunity is qualified (or not qualified) to perform the duties of that job.*

(Emphasis added.) *Id.* at 1009. The Ninth Circuit, citing *K.R.K. Irvine, Inc.*, 699 F.2d at 1006, revisited this issue, stating:

The Department of Labor (DOL) must certify that insufficient domestic workers are available to perform the job and that the alien's performance of the job will not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of similarly employed domestic workers. *Id.* § 212(a)(14), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(14). The INS then makes its own determination of the alien's entitlement to sixth preference status. *Id.* § 204(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1154(b). *See generally K.R.K. Irvine, Inc. v. Landon*, 699 F.2d 1006, 1008 9th Cir.1983).

The INS, therefore, may make a de novo determination of whether the alien is in fact qualified to fill the certified job offer.

Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman, 736 F. 2d 1305, 1309 (9th Cir. 1984).

Therefore, it is the DOL's responsibility to determine whether there are qualified U.S. workers

available to perform the offered position, and whether the employment of the beneficiary will adversely affect similarly employed U.S. workers. It is the responsibility of USCIS to determine if the beneficiary qualifies for the offered position, and whether the offered position and the beneficiary are eligible for the requested employment-based immigrant visa classification.

Eligibility for the Classification Sought

Section 203(b)(2) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(2), provides immigrant classification to members of the professions holding advanced degrees. *See also* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(k)(1).

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(k)(2) defines the terms "advanced degree" and "profession." An "advanced degree" is defined as:

[A]ny United States academic or professional degree or a foreign equivalent degree above that of baccalaureate. A United States baccalaureate degree or a foreign equivalent degree followed by at least five years of progressive experience in the specialty shall be considered the equivalent of a master's degree. If a doctoral degree is customarily required by the specialty, the alien must have a United States doctorate or a foreign equivalent degree

A "profession" is defined as "one of the occupations listed in section 101(a)(32) of the Act, as well as any occupation for which a United States baccalaureate degree or its foreign equivalent is the minimum requirement for entry into the occupation." The occupations listed at section 101(a)(32) of the Act are "architects, engineers, lawyers, physicians, surgeons, and teachers in elementary or secondary schools, colleges, academies, or seminaries."

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(k)(3)(i) states that a petition for an advanced degree professional must be accompanied by:

- (A) An official academic record showing that the alien has a United States advanced degree or a foreign equivalent degree; or
- (B) An official academic record showing that the alien has a United States baccalaureate degree or a foreign equivalent degree, and evidence in the form of letters from current or former employer(s) showing that the alien has at least five years of progressive post-baccalaureate experience in the specialty.

In addition, the job offer portion of the labor certification must require a professional holding an advanced degree. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(k)(4)(i).

Therefore, an advanced degree professional petition must establish that the beneficiary is a member of the professions holding an advanced degree, and that the offered position requires, at a minimum, a professional holding an advanced degree. Further, an "advanced degree" is a U.S. academic or

professional degree (or a foreign equivalent degree) above a baccalaureate, or a U.S. baccalaureate (or a foreign equivalent degree) followed by at least five years of progressive experience in the specialty.

As noted above the [REDACTED] evaluation states that the beneficiary obtained a U.S. bachelor's in science degree in CIS, and has, as a result of progressively more responsible employment experiences, an educational background equivalent to that of an individual with a bachelor's degree in CIS from an accredited university in the United States.

The evaluation in the record used the rule to equate three years of experience for one year of education, but that equivalence applies to non-immigrant H1B petitions, not to immigrant petitions. See 8 CFR § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(D)(5). The beneficiary was required to have a bachelor's degree on the ETA Form 9089. The petitioner's actual minimum requirements could have been clarified or changed before the ETA Form 9089 was certified by the Department of Labor. USCIS may, in its discretion, use as advisory opinions statements submitted as expert testimony. However, where an opinion is not in accord with other information or is in any way questionable, the Service is not required to accept or may give less weight to that evidence. *Matter of Caron International*, 19 I&N Dec. 791 (Comm'r 1988); *Matter of Sea, Inc.*, 19 I&N Dec. 817 (Comm'r 1988). See also *Matter of D-R-*, 25 I&N Dec. 445 (BIA 2011)(expert witness testimony may be given different weight depending on the extent of the expert's qualifications or the relevance, reliability, and probative value of the testimony).

Neither the [REDACTED] nor the AACRO Edge educational evaluations establish that the beneficiary's CIS education and his Master of Arts degree in marketing when combined are the equivalent to a U.S. bachelor or master's degree in computer science from an accredited college or university. The labor certification requires a worker who possesses either a bachelor's degree in computer science and five years of progressive experience or a master's degree in computer science with one year of experience in the job offered. Therefore we find it more likely than not that the beneficiary does not possess either of the alternate education requirements provided for in the ETA Form 9089 which was signed by the petitioner and approved by the DOL.

Thus, after reviewing all of the evidence in the record, it is concluded that the petitioner has failed to establish that the beneficiary possesses at least a U.S. academic or professional degree (or a foreign equivalent degree) above a baccalaureate, or a U.S. baccalaureate (or a foreign equivalent degree) followed by at least five years of progressive experience in the specialty. Therefore, the beneficiary does not qualify for classification as an advanced degree professional under section 203(b)(2) of the Act.

The Minimum Requirements of the Offered Position

The petitioner must also establish that the beneficiary satisfied all of the educational, training, experience and any other requirements of the offered position by the priority date. 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(1), (12). *See Matter of Wing's Tea House*, 16 I&N Dec. 158, 159 (Act. Reg. Comm. 1977); *see also Matter of Katigbak*, 14 I&N Dec. 45, 49 (Reg. Comm. 1971).

In evaluating the job offer portion of the labor certification to determine the required qualifications for the position, USCIS may not ignore a term of the labor certification, nor may it impose additional requirements. *See Madany*, 696 F.2d at 1008; *K.R.K. Irvine, Inc.*, 699 F.2d at 1006; *Stewart Infra-Red Commissary of Massachusetts, Inc. v. Coomey*, 661 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1981).

Where the job requirements in a labor certification are not otherwise unambiguously prescribed, e.g., by regulation, USCIS must examine "the language of the labor certification job requirements" in order to determine what the petitioner must demonstrate about the beneficiary's qualifications. *Madany*, 696 F.2d at 1015. The only rational manner by which USCIS can be expected to interpret the meaning of terms used to describe the requirements of a job in a labor certification is to "examine the certified job offer *exactly* as it is completed by the prospective employer." *Rosedale Linden Park Company v. Smith*, 595 F. Supp. 829, 833 (D.D.C. 1984)(emphasis added). USCIS's interpretation of the job's requirements, as stated on the labor certification must involve "reading and applying *the plain language* of the [labor certification]." *Id.* at 834 (emphasis added). USCIS cannot and should not reasonably be expected to look beyond the plain language of the labor certification or otherwise attempt to divine the employer's intentions through some sort of reverse engineering of the labor certification. Even though the labor certification may be prepared with the beneficiary in mind, USCIS has an independent role in determining whether the beneficiary meets the labor certification requirements. *See Snapnames.com, Inc. v. Michael Chertoff*, 2006 WL 3491005 *7 (D. Or. Nov. 30, 2006).

In the instant case, the labor certification states that the offered position requires either a bachelor's degree in computer science and five years of progressive work experience or a master's degree in computer science with one year of experience in the job offered.

For the reasons explained above, the petitioner has failed to establish that the beneficiary possesses a either a bachelor's degree in computer science and five years of progressive work experience or a master's degree in computer science with one year of experience in the job offered.

The petitioner failed to establish that the beneficiary possessed the minimum requirements of the offered position set forth on the labor certification by the priority date. Accordingly, the petition must also be denied for this reason.

Further, beyond the decision of the director, the petitioner has also failed to establish its ability to pay the proffered wage as of the priority date and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2).

In determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage, USCIS first examines whether the petitioner has paid the beneficiary the full proffered wage each year from the priority date. If the petitioner has not paid the beneficiary the full proffered wage each year, USCIS will next examine whether the petitioner had sufficient net income or net current assets to pay the difference between the wage paid, if any, and the proffered wage.⁹ If the petitioner's net income or net current assets is not sufficient to demonstrate the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage, USCIS may also consider the overall magnitude of the petitioner's business activities. See *Matter of Sonegawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (Reg. Comm'r 1967).

In the instant case, the petitioner did not establish that it employed the beneficiary or paid the beneficiary the full proffered wage each year, and its net income and net current assets, were not equal or greater to the proffered wage for 2009, 2010, 2011, or 2012. Further, the petitioner failed to establish that factors similar to *Sonegawa* existed in the instant case, which would permit a conclusion that the petitioner had the ability to pay the proffered wage despite its shortfalls from its net income and net current assets. The petitioner has not provided any initial evidence establishing its ability to pay the proffered wage of \$108,118.40 per year. While the record does contain some computer generated paystubs for the beneficiary, the record is absent any evidence of the petitioner's complete annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements for each year from the priority date. While additional evidence may be submitted to establish the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage, it may not be substituted for evidence required by regulation. The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(8)(ii) states in pertinent part:

Initial evidence. If all required initial evidence is not submitted with the application or petition or does not demonstrate eligibility, USCIS in its discretion may deny the application or petition for lack of initial evidence or for ineligibility or request that the missing initial evidence be submitted within a specified period of time as determined by USCIS.

In the instant case, the petitioner failed to submit initial evidence of its continuing ability to pay the proffered wage with the petition, and therefore, USCIS was not obligated to issue a Request for Evidence (RFE) seeking the missing initial evidence of the petitioner's eligibility.

Next, according to USCIS records, the petitioner has filed 89 Form I-140 petitions on behalf of other beneficiaries. Accordingly, the petitioner must establish that it has had the continuing ability to pay the

⁹ See *River Street Donuts, LLC v. Napolitano*, 558 F.3d 111 (1st Cir. 2009); *Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Sava*, 632 F. Supp. 1049, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); *Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman*, 736 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1984)); *Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh*, 719 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Texas 1989); *K.C.P. Food Co. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); *Ubeda v. Palmer*, 539 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1982), *aff'd*, 703 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1983); and *Taco Especial v. Napolitano*, 696 F. Supp. 2d 873 (E.D. Mich. 2010).

combined proffered wages to each beneficiary from the priority date of the instant petition. *See Matter of Great Wall*, 16 I&N Dec. 142, 144-145 (Acting Reg'l Comm'r 1977).

The evidence in the record does not document the priority date, proffered wage or wages paid to each beneficiary, whether any of the other petitions have been withdrawn, revoked, or denied, or whether any of the other beneficiaries have obtained lawful permanent residence. Thus, it is also concluded that the petitioner has not established its continuing ability to pay the proffered wage to the beneficiary and the proffered wages to the beneficiaries of its other petitions.

Accordingly, after considering the totality of the circumstances, the petitioner has also failed to establish its continuing ability to pay the proffered wage to the beneficiary since the priority date.

III. CONCLUSION

In summary, the petitioner failed to establish that the beneficiary possessed an advanced degree as required by the terms of the labor certification and the requested preference classification. Therefore, the beneficiary does not qualify for classification as a member of the professions holding an advanced degree under section 203(b)(2) of the Act. Further, it is also concluded that the petitioner has not established its continuing ability to pay the proffered wage to the beneficiary and to the beneficiaries of its other petitions. The director's decision denying the petition is affirmed.

The appeal will be dismissed for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and alternate basis for the decision. In visa petition proceedings, it is the petitioner's burden to establish eligibility for the immigration benefit sought. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361; *Matter of Otiende*, 26 I&N Dec. 127, 128 (BIA 2013). Here, that burden has not been met.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.